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 Refining the Reasonable Observer 
B Y: TlMOTHY MALACRIDA 
"[O]ur observer continues to be biased, replete with foibles, and prone to mistake ... selective, 
vision impaired, and a bit of a hot-rodder our observer may be, but the reasonable observer of 
Justice O'Connor,s description he is not."1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Identifying when a law, practice or display runs afoul of the Establishment Clause 
continues to be a challenge for individuals and courts. 1bis is due, in large part, to the lack of 
clear standards from the Supreme Court and the varied application of existing standards by 
judges of the lower federal courts.2 The Court has several different tests to help courts determine 
when religion violates the Constitutional mandate that separates church and state.3 Among the 
most popular tests articulated by the Court in its attempts at defining the arena of Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence are the three-pronged Lemon test,4 several iterations of a coercion analysis,5 
and variations of the endorsement test.6 Because of the complexity of Establishment Clause 
cases, and the delicate balance that exists between accommodating free exercise while not 
endorsing religion, courts cannot leave the practice of drawing lines of constitutional 
permissibility to a single test. 7 It is important for the federal courts to reevaluate their past 
1 Am. Atheists v. Duncan, 637 F.3d 1095, 1108-{)9 (lOth Cir. Dec. 20, 2010) (denial of rehearing en bane) (Gorsuch, 
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011). 
2 Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,623 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Unfortunately, even the 
development of articulable standards and guidelines bas not always resulted in agreement among the Members of 
this Court on the results in inclividual cases."). 
3 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,425 (1962). 
4 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,612-13 (1971). 
s Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677,693 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,592 
(1992); idat 640 (Scalia, J ., clissenting) (defining the crux of a coercion analysis as coercion through the 
fovemment's power). 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (establishing the endorsement test). 
Justice Kennedy offered an alternative to the endorsement analysis which sets proselytization as the bar for 
endorsement. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,659-79 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
7 Bd. OfEduc. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 720 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (finding that ftmding 
a school clistrict created in accordance with where a particular religious group lived, was impennissible ) . 
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analyses in order to reduce misapplication by judges and properly refme the tests that intend to 
protect our constitutional rights. 
One test that can benefit from refmement, as evidenced by the tremendous difficulty 
judges have in uniformly applying it, is Justice O'Connor's endorsement test.8 Issues of 
inconsistency primarily arise from the varied application of the "reasonable" or "objective" 
observer.9 Some judges create observers that are hostile to religion, often the equivalent of a 
heckler's veto, and style them "reasonable" or "objective" to seemingly fall within the Supreme 
Court precedent and the precedent of their own circuit.10 Other jurists create observers that seem 
overly accommodating or deferential to religion such that displays, laws and practices that 
involve religious content are rarely struck down as unconstitutiona1.11 In this way, the First 
Amendment rights of every American are threatened by a judiciary in need of further guidance. 
While Justice O'Connor expected and embraced some flexibility and case-specific fmdings of 
fact, the practices of these jurists are not the virtuous flexibility built into the endorsement test.12 
This Comment will propose a solution to this seemingly unworkable metric. It will 
attempt to defme the reasonable observer as much as possible for the courts in an effort to 
minimize the variables judges are able to put into their observers and ultimately provide Justice 
8 See, e.g., Am. Atheists v. Duncan, 637 F.3d 1095,1111 (lOth Cir. 2010) (holclingthatthe display of a cross to 
honor fallen patrolmen was a violation of the establishment clause), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011) 
9 Jd 
10 Am. Atheists v. Duncan, 637 F.3d 1095, 1104 (Dec. 20, 2010) (denial of rehearing en bane) (Kelly, J., dissenting), 
cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011); Green v. Haskell Cnty. Bd. ofComm'rs, 574 F.3d 1235, 1243-44 (lOth Cir. July 
30, 2009) (denial of rehearing en bane) (Gorusch, J., dissenting). 
District court opinions also may provide insight into the qualities put into the reasonable observer, however 
this Comment only analyzes appellate decisions because of their value as binding precedent. 
11 See, e.g., Elewski v. City of Syracuse, 123 F.3d 51 (2ndcir. 1997) (holding that the display of Christmas decor 
throughout the city was not an endorsement and granting extraordinary knowledge to the "reasonable observer'' in 
the form of understanding the goings on of private commercial enterprises such as shopping malls). 
12 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,783 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) 
("[F]lexibility is a virtue and not a vice .... "). 
2 
O'Connor's virtuous flexibility while keeping results within a permissible range. 13 Such a 
solution returns the endorsement test to Justice O'Connor's original intent of protecting from an 
actual threat to constitutional liberties, namely the perception that one's ''standing in the political 
community" changes based on religious belief or affiliation.14 
1bis Comment will analyze the characteristics articulated by members of the Court and 
examine the federal circuit court decisions that create, or fail to create-in whole or in part-a 
"reasonable" observer. Finally, this Comment will provide a framework under which courts can 
apply, with more accuracy and uniformity, the reasonable observer inquiry of Justice O'Connor's 
endorsement test. The endorsement test, with the proper refmements, is a workable standard and 
a valuable tool for courts seeking to protect First Amendment rights. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Justice 0' Connor outlined the endorsement test in her 1984 concurring opinion in Lynch 
v. Donnelly where the Court considered a holiday display of a creche on public ground in the city 
of Pawtucket, Rhode Island 15 The test evolved from the Lemon v. Kurtzman framework, 
articulated more than a decade earlier, and sought to clarify the oft criticized test while 
13 One must always accept that there will be some issues on the margins that will not be decided uniformly, but this 
is the nature of cases ''sensitive to context'' and should not be seen as a reason to disregard the test completely. 
Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,629 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The key is to shrink the 
margins and provide uniformity wherever possible. A disinterested (neither hostile nor deferential) observer is the 
appropriate standard for courts in light of Justice O'Connor's instructions and the Supreme Court's precedent. 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) e[The Constitution] affirmatively mandates accommodation, not 
merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any.") (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314, 
315 (1952)). 
Professor Brainerd Currie once wrote "[b]ad law makes hard cases." Brainerd Currie, Married Women's 
Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U Chi. L. Rev. 227,245 (1958). This reversal of the old adage 
"b,ard cases make bad law" seems to hold true in endorsement test inquiries in so far as an unclear standard has 
produced the troubling result of eliminating unifonnity and predictability in the federal courts. 
14 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
15 Id at 687-94. 
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preserving its central elements.16 While clarification of the Lemon test was the primary goal of 
the endorsement test, the Lynch concurrence ultimately provided a new metric against which 
courts analyze challenged laws, practices and displays. 17 
Lemon instructed courts to look at three separate considerations, commonly termed 
prongs, that the Court previously developed to protect against the "three main evils against 
which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection: 'sponsorship, financial 
support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.'"18 The purpose prong 
requires that the actor has a subjective purpose that is secular, 19 the effect prong states that the 
"principal or primary effect ... neither enhances nor inhibits religion"20 and the entanglement 
prong states that there must not be '"an excessive government entanglement with religion."'21 
Seeing two possible ways the government could violate the Establishment Clause, Justice 
0' Connor reduced the Lemon test to two inquiries for her endorsement test: the first focusing on 
"excessive entanglement with religious institutions, which may interfere with the independence 
of the institutions, give the institutions access to government or governmental powers not fully 
shared by nonadherents of the religion, and foster the creation of political constituencies defined 
along religious lines"22 and the second concerning whether government endorses or disapproves 
of religion?3 
16 Id at 688-89. For general criticisms of the Lemon test, in whole or in part, see, Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 
578, 636--40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108-13 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403, n. 11 (1983); Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 
736, 768-69 (1976) (White, J., concurring). 
17 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
18 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)). 
19 ld at 612. 
20 Id at 612 (citing Bd. ofEduc. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,243 (1968)). 
21 Jd. at 613 (quoting Walz, 391 U.S. at 674). 
22 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
23 ld at 688. 
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Justice O'Connor opined in her Lynch concurrence that in order to determine whether 
government disavowed or endorsed religion courts must conduct an " [ e ]xamination of both the 
subjective and the objective components of the message communicated by a government 
action."24 This examination, itself composed of two inquiries, accounts for the concerns of both 
the purpose and effect prongs of the Lemon test while leaving the entanglement prong as a 
separate consideration?5 The subjective inquiry considers only the intent of the challenged law, 
display or practice and is a distinct consideration having no place or weight in the objective 
analysis, and instead focuses solely on whether the actor's purpose is to impermissibly endorse 
religion?6 The objective inquiry is a distinct consideration from the subjective inquiry and 
determines whether an endorsement or disavowal of religion occurs without consideration of 
personal feelings; but rather through the eyes of a hypothetical observer of the challenged, 
display, practice or law.27 Justice O'Connor further opined that she envisioned the use of an 
objective observer for the endorsement test as a vehicle to return the Court's focus to the 
principle that the government's approval or disavowal of religion is only relevant where such a 
fmding objectively demonstrates that religion is "relevant, in reality or public perception, to 
status in the political community."28 
While Justice O'Con...nor's influential concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donne !ley stopped 
short of styling the observer as "reasonable," it extensively developed the concept of an objective 
interpretation of a display or practice as the proper path for finding an endorsement or disavowal 
of religion when a secular purpose is present.29 The objective interpretation, as Justice O'Connor 
24 ld at 690. 
25 ld. 
26 I d at 690-91. 
27 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
28 ld at 692. 
29 I d. at 692-94. 
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described it, is made in light of the unique context, with knowledge of the "history and ubiquity" 
of the challenged display or practice.30 Justice O'Connor also opined in Lynch that what is 
''objective" is a factor to be determined ~'within the community."31 
Lower courts did not have much time to apply Justice O'Connor's endorsement test 
before she revisited it in the Court's 1985 term.32 Justice O'Connor clarified her analysis and 
employed an "objective observer" to whom knowledge of"the text, legislative history, and 
implementation ofthe statute" is attributed?3 In the Court's 1986 term, Justice O'Connor 
ultimately determined the objective observer should also be a "reasonable observer."34 
In the years following Lynch, Justice 0' Connor provided some defming characteristics 
for the reasonable observer.35 Justice O'Connor deemed the observer akin to the hypothetical 
"reasonable person in tort law" who should not carry prejudices, be overly sensitive, mistaken or 
otherwise unreasonable. 36 Beyond helping to set the observer's identity, the analogy to the 
reasonable person of tort law further shows that the observer standard does not accept input from 
uthc perceptions of particular individuals," or ~'the actual perception of individual observers who 
naturally hove differing degrees ofknowledge," or even un amalgamation ofindividuuls.37 
30 ld at 692-93. 
31 Id at 690. 
32 Wallace v. Jaffree, 470 U.S. 38, 69-70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
33 Id at 76. Justice O'Connor continued to use the term "objective" to describe the endorsement test's observer. See 
Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 712 (1985) (O'Connor J., concurring). 
34 Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,493 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
35 See Symposium, Measured Endorsement, 60 MD. L. REv. 713 (2001). 
36 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,779-80 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) 
(internal quotations omitted). "The reasonable man is a fictitious person, who is never negligent, and whose 
conduct is always up to standard. He is not to be identified with any real person." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS§ 283 cmt. c (1965). 
37 Pinette, 515 U.S. at 779. This also represents a rejection of the heckler's veto. Justice O'Connor clearly dismisses 
the application of a nonadherent as the reasonable observer. Id at 780. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 
283 cmt. c (1965) ("The standard which the community demands must be an objective and external one, rather than 
that of the individual judgment, good or bad, of the particular individual."). The standard is required to be identical 
no matter who is challenging, because "the law can have no favorites" in tort, or in religion. See id 
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Justice O'Connor deemed the hypothetical reasonable observer "more informed than the casual 
passerby,"38 and not "limited to the information gleaned simply from viewing the challenged 
display."39 Justice O'Connor, though indicating the observer was an ideal, did not style the 
observer as extraordinary with regard to the scope of his knowledge, nor "ultra-reasonable."40 
In the same vein, the hypothetical observer created by Justice O'Connor had a reasonable 
memory of actions, but not an intricate knowledge of legal minutia.41 The observer, being 
reasonable, could "recognize the distinction between speech the government supports and speech 
that it merely allows" and "read and understand an adequate disclaimer."42 Similarly, the 
observer Justice O'Connor envisioned possessed an understanding of our nation's history and 
"culturallandscape".43 The observer respected certain religious references in public life as 
useful tools for solemnizing secular occasions and acknowledging our history and did not see 
these practices as an endorsement or disavowal but rather considered them "ceremonial deism".44 
The observer was not hyper-sensitive to religious references, but instead a stable-minded and 
objective hypothetical set of eyes through which courts could temper their own views and the 
views of litigants in order to reach constitutionally permissible results. 
Despite Justice O'Connor's guidance, the Court remains rather vague with regard to any 
further instructions about the observer's identity or the correct application of the objective 
inquiry, and its precedent offers little in the way of lucidity to the muddied waters of 
38 Pinette, 515 U.S. at 779. 
39 I d. at 780. 
4
° Compare id. at 781 (O'Connor, J., concurring), with id at 807 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
41 Pinette, 515 U.S. at 781 (O'Connor, J. concurring). 
42 I d. at 782. See also Zehnan v. Simmons~Hanis, 536 U.S. 639, 655 (2002) {'4[N]o reasonable observer would think 
a neutral program of private choice, where state aid reaches religious schools solely as a result of the numerous 
independent decisions of private individuals, carries with it the imprimatur of government endorsement."); Mitchell 
v. Hehns, 530 U.S. 793, 843 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[E]ndorsement of the religious message is 
reasonably attributed to the individuals who select the path of the aid."). 
43 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. I, 36 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
44 ld. at 36-37. 
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Establislunent Clause jurisprudence created by the courts. 45 This lack of clarity causes much 
criticism of the endorsement test for not providing a useful metric, 46 and for not achieving its 
objective of enforcing the Establishment Clause consistently.47 Criticism also comes from other 
members of the Court over the variables that comprise the test,48 and whether the Court can, or 
should, draw the lines the endorsement test requires.49 
45 More than two decades after her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, Justice O'Connor stated that "we do not 
count heads before enforcing the First Amendment." McCreary Cnty v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 884 (2005) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). This instruction could be seen as muddying the prior instructions regarding the 
endorse~ent test, because the former guideline instructed courts to inquire into the community ideal. Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 
542 U.S. 1, 35 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring) e'[T]he 'reasonable observer' must embody a community ideal of 
social judgment, as well as rational judgment."). Similarly, the identity of the observer has not been consistent in 
the minds of the Justices, nor has the amount of knowledge attributed to the observer. Compare Santa Fe lndep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (determining that an objective secondary school student was an appropriate 
observer), andBd. ofEduc. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,250 (1990) (determining that a secondary school student 
could discern between public and private speech), with Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1824 (2010) (Alito, J., 
concurring) ("The endorsement test views a challenged display through the eyes of a hypothetical reasonable 
observer who is deemed to be aware of the history and all other pertinent facts relating to a challenged display."), 
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 696 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("This Court looks for the meaning to an 
observer of indeterminate religious affiliation who knows all the facts and circumstances surrounding a challenged 
display."), and Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. at 34-35 ( 2004) (O'Connor J., concurring) ("Given the 
dizzying religious heterogeneity of our Nation, adopting a subjective approach would reduce the test to an 
absurdity."). 
The instruction pertaining to the endorsement test maintains that it is against the idea of a heckler's veto, 
but applying anything other than the hypothetical observer opens the door for the nonadherent observer. The Court 
rejected child observers stating, "[w ]e decline to employ Establishment Clause jurisprudence using a modified 
heckler's veto, in which a group's religious activity can be proscribed on the basis of what the youngest members of 
the audience might misperceive." Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119 (2001). 
46 Justice Kennedy opined "the endorsement test is flawed in its fundamentals and unworkable in practice. The 
uncritical adoption of this standard is every bit as troubling as the bizarre result it produces in the cases before us." 
Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 669 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); accord McCreary Cnty. v. 
ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 901 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]hat oddity pales in comparison to the one invited by 
today's analysis: the legitimacy of a government action with a wholly secular effect would turn on the misperception 
of an imaginary observer that the government officials behind the action had the intent to advance religion."); 
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 768 n. 3 (1995) (Scalia, J., opining) ("It supplies 
no standard whatsoever. The lower federal courts ... have reached precisely differing results--which is what led the 
Court to take this case."). 
47 McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 907 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("(I]nconsistency may be explicable 
in theory, but I suspect that the "objective observer" with whom the Court is so concerned will recognize its 
absurdity in practice."); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 674 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Either 
the endorsement test must invalidate scores of traditional practices recognizing the place religion holds in our 
culture, or it must be twisted and stretched to avoid inconsistency with practices we know to have been pennitted in 
the past, while condemning similar practices with no greater endorsement effect simply by reason of their lack of 
historical antecedent."). 
48 Pinette, 515 U.S. at 799-800 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the standard should only be whether an 
individual could perceive an endorsement). "[P]assersby, including schoolchildren, traveling salesmen, and tourists 
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However, early in the development of the endorsement test Justice O'Connor recognized 
that bright line rules of universal applicability were not the intended end-product of the 
reasonable observer inquiry, which intentionally incorporates a degree of virtuous flexibility.50 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's failure to articulate a consistent metric that the lower courts 
can apply uniformly is not evidence that the test cannot work, but rather an invitation to better 
the test-and Establishment Clause jurisprudence-by identifying the missteps of the various 
circuit courts and eliminating the pitfalls that plague the judiciary. Prior criticism of the test is 
no reason to think that it cannot be refmed into a workable standard for future courts. Failure to 
better defme the reasonable observer inquiry of the endorsement test relegates it to a status as the 
new "sisyphean task of trying to patch together the 'blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier"' 
invoked by the Supreme Court. 51 
II. ANALYSIS 
Realistically, the concept of a reasonable observer will never be a truly static metric 
because judges will always have to perform an inquiry particular to every case, which will force 
them to make decisions about what the observer considers and weighs as persuasive. 52 Defined 
parameters-in the absence of a static metric for the variables that most often create an 
inadequate observer- will present the courts with a better test and an opportunity to analyze 
with uniformity when seeking to preserve the Constitutional prohibition against an establishment 
of religion. Without intervention in the form of greater delineation, flawed application of the 
as much as those who live next to the statehouse, are members of the body politic, and they are equally entitled to be 
free from government endorsement of religion." Jd. at 808 n. 14. 
49 
"This Court is ill equipped to sit as a national theology board, and I question both the wisdom and the 
constitutionality of its doing so." Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 678 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
50 ld. at 629 (O'Connor, J., concurring); accord Pinette, 515 U.S. at 783 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
51 Comm. for Pub. Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (originally 
referring to the Lemon v. Kurtzman test). 
52 Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 629 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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endorsement test's reasonable observer inquiry, while considering Establishment Clause 
violations, will persist and present a troublesome lack of uniformity often resulting in 
unacceptable deference or hostility.53 Furthermore, the reasonable observer inquiry needs 
clarification in order to return its focus to Justice O'Connor's belief that the crux of an 
Establishment Clause violation, under this element of the test, is whether a hypothetical, 
objective and reasonable observer believes that, by virtue of the challenged display, law or 
practice, religion is relevant to standing in the political community.54 A well-defmed reasonable 
observer, in the hands of a refocused judiciary, is potentially a great tool for protecting 
Americans' constitutional rights. 
However, before engaging in an analysis of the qualities of the observer, it is important to 
note the characteristic that underlies all the observer's qualities: objectivity. As Professor Dane 
correctly opined on the recent Rhode Island school prayer case, Ahlquist v. City of Cranston ,55 
the litigant's analysis is not correct when framed as "a personal affront that sent her the message 
'you don't belong here,'" such a standard "merely reflects the wrongheaded psychological tum 
in current Establishment Clause thinking and misses the real constitutional point."56 Professor 
Dane succinctly identified a common misstep of litigants and jurists alike; the reasonable 
observer's analysis is wholly objective at all points in the inquiry and his views are not subject to 
the whims of litigious individuals on a crusade or those who harbor personal vendettas. 57 With 
53 See, e.g. Am. Atheists v. Duncan, 637 F.3d 1095, 1108-09 (lOth Cir. Dec. 20, 2010) (denial of rehearing en bane) 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011). 
54 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
55 Ahlquist v. City of Cranston, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3348 (D.RI. Jan. 11, 2012). 
56 Perry Dane, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. I, 2012 at A26 (emphasis added), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/0l/opinion/the-atheist-who-challenged-cranston-ri.html?re:f=letters. 
57 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring). The use of masculine pronouns throughout this Comment has no bearing on the observer's identity and 
is primarily a matter of convenience and clarity. The gender, sexual orientation, and any other lifestyle choices of 
the observer are of little consequence in the endorsement analysis. See, e.g., Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 
217 (1Oth Cir. 1996) C'Empirical data is not needed because we do not concern ourselves with personal perceptions, 
10 
the understanding that the views and feelings of the complaining litigant are irrelevant to the 
observer analysis, and by leaving the subjective intent and entanglement inquiries as distinct 
considerations, one can begin to disassemble and refine the observer in an attempt to better the 
whole by perfecting its parts. 
A. A Singular Observer 
Judges vary with regard to the number of observers they employ in their endorsement 
analyses. 58 The precedent from the Court indicates a single observer is the appropriate standard, 
but some judges-particularly when dealing with large displays encountered by crowds or in 
school settings-fail to comply with this standard and analyze the views of multiple observers. 59 
The Court never utilized, or condoned the use of, an "alternate" observer when their employed 
reasonable observer failed to find a violation. 60 The prohibition against alternate observers is 
logical; alternate observers cannot exist because they ultimately allow judges to indulge in an 
impermissible subjective inquiry and invite the hunt for the heckler's veto that the endorsement 
analysis definitively condemns. 61 
nor the perceptions of a nonadherent, but rafuer a reasonable standard."). But see, ACLU of N.J. v. Black Horse Pike 
Reg'l Bd. ofEduc., 84 F.3d I471, I496 (3rd Cir. I996) (en bane) (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (using a "reasonable 
religionist" as the observer). 
58 See infra note 59. 
59 See, e.g., Freedom From Religion Foundation v. Hanover Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d I, II, n. 19 (1st Cir. 20IO) 
(declining to determine which observer the court would apply, indicating the potential for multiple observers); 
Borden v. Sch. Dist. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3D 153, 186 (3rd Cir. 2008) (Barry, J., concurring) (indicating that the 
observer could be any of a number of individuals when the local high school's football coach was the individual 
violating the Constitution with pre-game prayer); Skoros v City ofNew York. 437 F.3d I, 43 (2nd Cir. 2006) 
(Straub, J., dissenting) (arguing that the observer should be both the parent and the child in cases involving 
classroom curricula); Freedom From Religion Foundation Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487,495-96 (7th Cir. 
2000) (using language that implies different observers could permissibly exist and have varying degrees of 
knowledge regarding the erection of a monument in a public park). 
60 An "alternate observer" approach would be antithetical to the idea of a hypothetical, ideal observer. 
61 Skoros, 437 F.3d at 43. See also Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1037-38 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(holding ~~der God" in the pledge of allegiance is not an endorsement); Briggs v. Mississippi, 33I F.3d 499, 507 
(5th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the hunt for a heckler's veto is inappropriate and holding fuat the St. Andrews Cross 
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Similarly, courts should not concern themselves with the analysis of a particular group. 
Justice O'Connor explicitly instructed that courts should not look to nonadherents to find the 
characteristics of a reasonable observer.62 The reasonable observer, by virtue of his 
reasonability, feels no influence from societal pressure to see an endorsement or a disavowal 
where there is none. Furthermore, just as alternate individual characteristics have no place in the 
analysis, considerations of particular group dynamics and feelings are inappropriate. 63 Precedent 
illustrates that the observer must be a single individual. Thus, the use of an alternative observer 
to achieve a different result than the reasonable observer inquiry yields is impermissible. 
B. A Mature Observer 
In a select group of cases, usually challenges involving school-age children, classroom 
curriculums or public displays with which children come into contact many judges seek to use a 
child as the reasonable observer.64 While a child's viewpoint may be appropriate for a coercion 
analysis, 65 the reasonable observer inquiry of the endorsement test does not tolerate a changing 
·'· 
on the Mississippi state flag was permissible); ACLU of Ohio Foundation, Inc. v. Ashbrook, 375 F.3d 484, 505-06 
(6th Cir. 2004) (Batchelder, J., dissenting) (considering a courtroom display ofthe Ten Commandments). 
62 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
63 See, Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214,217 (lOth Cir. 1996); But see, e.g., ACLU ofN.J. v. Black Horse Pike 
Reg'l Bd. ofEduc., 84 F.3d 1471, 1496 (3rd Cir. 1996) (en bane) (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (using a "reasonable 
religionist'' as a standard). 
64 Bronx Household ofFaith v. Bd. ofEduc. ofN.Y.C., 650 F.3d 30,45 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 816 
(20 11) (questioning whether religious groups could use public schools outside of school hours); N ewdow v. Rio 
Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("Five-year-olds are not the 
'youngest members of the audience,' they are the entire audience; 'the public writ large' does not attend 
kindergarten classes."); Skoros, 437 F.3d at 43, 50 (Straub, J., dissenting) (arguing against the court's holding that 
classroom holiday displays of the Star of David and Star and Crescent for Jewish and Muslim students respectively 
was not endorsement even though Christian children haq snowmen); Peck v. Upshur Cnty. Bd. ofEduc., 155 F.3d 
274,301 (4th Cir. 1998) (Motz, J., concurring and dissenting) (considering the audience of distribution ofbibles in 
public schools, a youthful observer standard might be appropriate); Brown v. Woodland Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 27 
F.3d 1373 (9th Cir. 1994) (using a child standard while considering "witchcraft" in the school curriculum as a 
potential endorsement violation); Fleishfresser v. Dirs. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 1994) (same). 
65 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
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viewpoint based on age.66 The reasonable observer, to conform to the proscriptions of the First 
Amendment and for true objectivity and uniformity, must remain as constant as possible and it 
only follows that the test therefore does not accommodate changing the age of the observer to 
affect the context in which he sees the display. 67 
Judges do not dismiss the views of children through their refusal to incorporate those 
impressionable views into the reasonable observer analysis; they simply preserve the integrity of 
the observer inquiry within the endorsement test. 68 Justice O'Connor noted that the endorsement 
test should not be the only test for Establishment Clause violations, which leaves room for a 
coercion analysis or another well formulated alternative to consider the views and feelings of 
younger children. 69 The observer-as a hypothetical construct--concerns himself only with the 
objective interpretation of the challenged law, practice or display to determine whether it indeed 
violates the Establishment Clause and just as his analysis is independent of the views of 
nonadherents the feelings of small and impressionable children must not shackle his views. 70 
66 Justice O'Connor opined that using a child in the endorsement analysis would amount to a heckler's veto. Good 
News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119 (2001). A child observer would ultimately be impossible in the 
endorsement analysis. It is unlikely that such a child observer would have the reasonability required of the observer, 
or the ability to adequately understand the display without outside explanation and interference. See, e.g., Skoros, 
437 F.3d at 23. While the observer is clearly a fiction, a ~'youthful reasonable observer'' takes the fiction to the point 
of absurdity. Litigants sometimes seek further diversion from the reasonable mature observer standard. See Croft v. 
Perry, 624 F.3d 157, 169 (5th Cir. 2010) (deeming the Texas pledge of allegiance, which contains the phrase "one 
state under God" to be permissible). 
67 The Court caused some confusion in this field, by applying a "secondary school student" as a reasonable observer. 
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding that an invocation at a high school graduation was 
an impermissible endorsement). 
68 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 119. 
69 Bd. ofEduc. of. Kllyas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687,720 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring). For one variation of 
the Court's "coercion" analysis see Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577 (1992). For an alternative view of coercion, see 
Justice Scalia's spirited dissenting opinion in Lee which maintained that it is coercion by force of law that is 
prohibited by the Establishment Clause.Jd at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
70 Allowing the observer to consider the views of children once again pushes him into the territory of head counting 
that was directly proscribed by Justice O'Connor. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 884 (2005) (O'Connor 
J ., concurring). Furthermore, as difficult as it is to gauge the average views of an adult, surely it is not practical for 
jurists to try and capture the beliefs of small children when consideling what a reasonable observer would see. But 
see Skoros, 437 F .3d at 23 (declining to use a school child as the observer, but allowing the observer to give weight 
to the opinions of impressionable school children). 
13 
While it is definite that an observer should not be a child, it is also important that the 
observer has no age or particular set of life experiences.71 Justice O'Connor, opining in Board of 
Education v. Mergens, noted that maturity is a threshold issue for the reasonable observer.72 As a 
legal fiction, the reasonable observer has the knowledge necessary to objectively view the 
display regardless of his indeterminate age.73 Because age, beyond the proscription against child 
observers, is irrelevant the only requirement court should take notice of is that the observer is 
mature and capable of objectively analyzing the display and processing the information that 
comprises its unique context. 74 
C. The Observation Requirement 
Due to disagreement among the Justices and the lack of a clear standard, 75 the circuit 
courts sometimes misapply the endorsement test-often while considering publicly erected, 
funded or protected monuments-by analyzing the perceptions of an observer who never viewed 
the display completely or appreciated its subtle elements. 76 Judges sometimes mistakenly alter 
their decisions regarding the observer inquiry by invoking the perception of motorists who only 
71 Even if the reasonable observer has not personally viewed displays that have existed throughout history, he would 
be able to appreciate them. See, Ams. United for Separation of Church and State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F .2d 
1538, 1549 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding the display of a menorah to be permissible). 
72 Bd. ofEduc. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,250 (1990) (O'Connor, J., opining). 
73 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 283 cmt. c (1965) {"The actor is required to do what the ideal individual 
would do ... He is not to be identified with any real person .... "). 
74 A "mature" standard accomplishes the goal of reconciling cases like Santa Fe with the rest of the endorsement 
test, while maintaining the prohibition against children. Attempting to set an age for the observer or defme the 
observer's age when considering a case would be irresponsible. By giving judges discretion over an observer's age, 
the test would open up a heckler's veto. Judges could seek to demonstrate that a particular age group would believe 
their political standing had been affected. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
75 Compare Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 808 n. 14 (1995) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting), with id at 779 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
76 Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099,1123 (9th Cir. 2011) (invalidating the display of a mountaintop 
memorial cross based on misperceptions, visibility and relative size of displays); Am. Atheists v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 
1145, 1160 (lOth Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011) (failing to appreciate the subtle elements of the 
display due to a high rate of speed and the relative sizes of elements); Ind. Civil Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 259 
F .3d 7 66, 772-73 (7th Cir. 2001) ( determinmg that the secular texts having a smaller font than religious texts on a 
public display could cause a misperception, and noting that "larger lettering also means that it can be observed more 
clearly from a distance ... [the ten commandments] stands alone on one side, totally isolated from the other texts .. 
. reasonably leadmg [to the belief] ... that the monument only displayed the sacred text."). 
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saw the largest portions of a mountain-top display because they passed by at highway-speeds or 
the views of individuals who approached from a particular direction. 77 Similarly judges 
erroneously allow their observers to place more value in font size than the totality of the 
display.78 
Returning to the guidance of Justice O'Connor, there is no room for misperception by the 
reasonable observer. 79 The observer is not a passerby or a casual observer, but rather an 
individual with the ability to see the entirety of the display or practice without blind spots.80 The 
observer fully appreciates the display, including any disclaimer signs, secular items or alternate 
religious elements and weighs them in his own mind. 81 As an ideal, the observer must have 
perfect vision in both a literal and a figurative sense and must observe the entirety of the display 
while still reasonably considering the unique context and history in which it exists. 82 
Criticism of the requirement to observe the entire display aims at the protection of 
passersby, but diminishing this aspect of the reasonable observer inquiry is a dangerous 
proposition. 83 To lower the bar to that of a passerby results in a heckler's veto and fails to 
represent an objective view.84 Justice O'Connor's observer protects from an objective 
endorsement of religion. The fact that a subjective viewer of the same display might find some 
77 Am. Atheists, 616 F.3d 1145, 1160. 
78 O'Bannon, 259 F.3d at 772-73. 
79Pinette, 515 U.S. at 779-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Paulson v. San Diego, 262 F.3d 885, 895 (9th Cir. 
2001) (holding that once the observer viewed the entire display any misperception from afar is erased); O'Bannon, 
259 F.3d at 776 (Coffey, J., dissenting). 
80Pinette, 515 U.S. at 779 (O'Connor, J., concurring); O'Bannon, 259 F.3d at 776 (Coffey, J., dissenting) ("When 
any person focuses on only one particular aspect of a monument or display to the exclusion of the other aspects it 
will distort even the most reasonable observer's opinion. It seems far more reasonable to assume that a person 
taking the time to gaze upon the beautiful edifice will look at all three sides."). 
81 Pinette, 515 U.S. at 782 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See, e.g., O'Connor v. Washburn Univ., 416 F.3d 1216, 
1228-31 (1Oth Cir. 2005) (holding that a statue mocking a Roman Catholic Bishop on the grounds of a public college 
was not an endorsement); ACLU ofN.J. v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92 (3rd Cir. 1999) (erecting a holiday display with a 
creche, menorah and other secular items was constitutional). 
82 Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 630-31 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
83 Pinette, 515 U.S. at 808 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
84 ld at 779 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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preference for religion is ultimately irrelevant to the analysis and is the purview of another test 
that might properly incorporate the subjective.85 The observer must observe fully and appreciate 
the subtleties of a display; to misperceive is fatal to the rights preserved by the Constitution. 86 
Requiring the observer to fully observe the display corrects decisions like the Ninth 
Circuit's Trunk v. City of San Diego. 87 In Trunk, the panel determined that the disputed cross, 
erected as a memorial display on public land and surrounded by smaller secular monuments, 
"painted a sectarian picture."88 Judge McKeown's opinion for the panel cited Justice 
Blackmun' s individual opinion, articulated in County of Allegheny v. A CL U, 89 regarding the size 
of the monument in relation to other elements of the display to support the proposition that 
disproportionate size could be dispositive.90 A complete observation of the display however, 
would show that the cross was a war memorial surrounded by "2, 1 00 black stone plaques 
honoring individual veterans, platoons, and groups of soldiers" along with many bollards 
honoring secular groups and the American flag.91 The Ninth Circuit's opinion also treated the 
fact that the cross was the only element visible from the highway as indicative of an endorsement 
because passing motorists saw only part of the monument.92 If the Ninth Circuit instead used an 
objective observer who viewed the entirety of the display, rather than a hostile observer who saw 
small secular monuments next to a large cross and felt the sectarian overshadowed the secular, or 
a passing motorist with limited vision, there is no logical reason to believe that observer would 
not appreciate the secular nature of the display in its entirety and note no endorsement of 
85ld 
86 Freedom From Religion Foundation v. Hanover Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 1, 11 (1 51 Cir. 2010) (holding "under God" in 
the pledge of allegiance was not an endorsement). 
87 Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F .3d 1 099, 1099 (9th Cir. 2011 ). 
88 ld at 1123. 
89 Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 617 (1989) (Brennan, J., opining). 
90 Trunk, 629 F.3d at 1123. 
91 ld at 1103. 
92 ld at 1123. 
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religion, let alone an endorsement that made religion relevant to standing in the political 
community. 
D. Relevant Knowledge 
Some judges-often when dealing with the conduct of public officials, public symbols or 
the presence of monuments on public land-grant the observer an almost omniscient status, 
while other courts are content with only attributing a common level of knowledge of public 
events to the observer.93 As Justice O'Connor envisioned, the observer should know the public 
history and ubiquity of the challenged practice, including public statements and reports.94 Justice 
O'Connor also opined that the observer should know the relevant history of a display,95 and 
possess a similar amount of knowledge in the context of challenged legislation. 96 
However, the courts should not stretch the observer's knowledge to expert-historian, or 
extend his knowledge to purely private statements and acts not likely known by the community 
or known acts not directly attributable to the public action in question.97 Judges seemingly have 
great difficulty when they attempt to draw the line between public knowledge and omniscience 
93 Compare Am. Atheists v. Duncan, 637 F.3d 1095, 1104-5 (lOth Cir. 2010) (denial of rehearing en bane) (Kelly, J., 
dissenting), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011) (suggesting the observer should know that an officer had died at that 
location, that the state had not endorsed the monument, what the motives of the display's creator were, and the 
reasons for a particular design element), with Green v. Haskell Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 574 F.3d 1235, 1240-42 (1Oth 
Cir. 2009) (denial of rehearing en bane) (Kelly, J., dissenting) (refusing to attribute private conduct of public 
officials to their official capacity when considering challenges to official conduct), and Catholic League for 
Religious and Civil Rights v. City & Cnty. ofS.F., 624 F.3d 1043, 1056 (9th Cir. 2010) (en bane) (declining to 
attribute knowledge of personal beliefs of public figures to the reasonable observer). 
94 Justice O'Connor noted that simply viewing the challenged display does not present the observer with enough 
knowledge. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
Justice Alito provided some context for the knowledge requirement by opining that the observer is aware of the 
"history and all other pertinent facts relating to a challenged display." Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1824 
(2010) (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Thomas similarly opined that he observer "knows all the facts and 
circumstances surrounding a challenged display." Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 696 (2005) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). Justice Stevens, taking an alternate view, provided a much more tailored knowledge to his observer.Jd 
at 718 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The reasonable observer, after all, has no way of knowing that this text was the 
product of a compromise, or that there is a rationale of any kind for the text's selection."). 
95 Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 781 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
96 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
97 See, e.g., Green, 574 F.3d at 1242. 
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in challenges concerning the activities of small local governments where citizens may be more 
familiar with their elected representatives. 98 Such an extension is beyond the relevant history 
allowed by the observer inquiry. The knowledge attributed to the observer, particularly with 
regard to history, should not be encyclopedic or all-encompassing because judges might use such 
a quantity of information to bias the observer.99 Relevance of the history is the best guide for the 
attribution of knowledge ofhistory.100 In order to prevent judges from using irrelevant facts to 
sway the observer's view, the observer should only consider those historical facts that reasonably 
relate to the display, practice or law in the compass of his knowledge. 
Similarly,judges often grant varying levels of knowledge regarding religion and religious 
symbols to their observers. 101 The observer should not be a religious scholar who looks for 
symbolism in his day-to-day life, nor should he be ignorant of religious symbols.102 It is clear 
that there are symbols with religious meaning that appear in public, perhaps even in our flags, 
seals, public grounds, government ceremonies, murals and monuments, but that does not mean 
98 ld (opining that the personal views of one commissioner, sitting on a three person panel, are irrelevant and 
therefore improper to consider in determining the intent of the Commission as a government actor). Judge Kelly's 
belief that judges must separate the personal beliefs of individuals from their intent as government servants when 
attributing knowledge to the reasonable observer is supported by the Supreme Court's precedent, further enforcing 
the idea that relevance of knowledge is an important test. See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 863 
(2005). 
99 For example, see Trunk v. City of San Diego where a Ninth Circuit panel cited anti-Semitism in the region many 
years before the lawsuit challenging the display, and attributed that knowledge to the observer who then used that 
biased history in his analysis of the display. Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1121 (9th Cir. 2011). But 
see, ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd., 243 F.3d 289, 303 (6th Cir. 2001) (declining to 
limit what the panel characterized as an encyclopedic knowledge while ruling on the Ohio state motto "With God, 
All Things Are Possible"). Surely judges would always be able to find some religious animosity if they delved into 
the history of an area. Such a consideration ofhistory also goes to the reasonability of the observer, and is indeed 
another point at which such superfluous history must fall from the analysis. 
100 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1824 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring). 
101 Compare Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc., v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 176 (3rd Cir. 2002) (attributing 
knowledge oflechis-items of religious significance to Orthodox Jews-to the reasonable observer while fmding 
installation on a utility pole permissible), with Briggs v. Mississippi, 331 F.3d 499, 507 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that 
the St. Andrews cross is not an overtly religious symbol despite its use in certain Christian denominations), and 
ACLU of Ohio, 243, F.3d at 302 (arguing against the observer knowing obscure religious symbols). 
102 Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 94 F .3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding a commemorative statue put up in the state 
park was not an endorsement). 
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they are endorsements. 103 The observer should possess a working knowledge of major religious 
symbols, but need not know arcane or obscure facts and practices.104 This is not to say that 
endorsement of a minority religion is acceptable simply because an observer does not know the 
symbols of the religion. Courts should presume the observer has a reasonable knowledge of 
relevant facts surrounding the religion allegedly involved and would therefore know the meaning 
of a symbol. 
In a case like Green v. Haskell County Board of Commissioners, which involved a small 
community's display of a monument containing the Ten Commandments and the Mayflower 
Compact surrounded by other secular monuments, the Tenth Circuit's decision to ban the display 
would likely change if the observer analysis only considered relevant history. 105 The Tenth 
Circuit failed to fully separate the individual beliefs and statements of the Commissioners from 
their statements as officials of the county when analyzing the monument, in part because 
"Haskell County is a place where '[e]veryone knows each other."'106 The court noted that some 
of the statements possessed what seemed like a government official supporting religion in line 
with personal beliefs, but that does not mean all the statements should be treated in that way.107 
Personal religious beliefs of public servants are not indicative of their reasons for casting a 
103 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 36-37 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see Weinbaum v. 
City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1033-34 (lOth Cir. 2008) (holding that displays of crosses were not an 
endorsement in a town whose name literally means ''the crosses"); Vasquez v. Los Angeles Cnty., 487 F.3d 1246, 
1257 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that removal of a cross from the Los Angeles County seal was not a disavowal of 
religion); Briggs v. Mississippi, 331 F.3d 499, 507 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that a St. Andrews Cross in the state flag 
of Mississippi was not an endorsement); King v. Richmond Cnty., 331 F.3d 127, 1283-84 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(determining that a sword, while sometimes a religious symbol, did not serve to endorse religion); Tenafly Eruv 
Ass'n, Inc., 309 F.3d at 176; Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147,156 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding the use of a Latin 
cross in the municipal flag was not an endorsement). 
104 In the same vein as minority religions, symbols of "dead" religions were considered in the modern courts, and 
have found to be non-religious. Alvarado, 94 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1996). This seems workable, as the symbols would 
represent a dormant piece ofhistory, and not an active religious symbol that could influence an individual's belief in 
their standing in the community, so long as there was no strong evidence that through use of the symbol the 
government was seeking to revive the "dead" religion. 
105 Green v. Haskell Cnty. Bd. ofComm'rs, 568 F.3d 784,789-91 (lOth Cir. 2009). 
106 Id at 801 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
107 Id at 801-2. 
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particular vote when the vote in question concerns a display with potentially religious 
significance. Private motivations should not be attributable to the government unless the 
government "fostered or encouraged the mistake."108 The court also incorrectly incorporated the 
motivations of the individual who requested the display's erection into the observer's 
knowledge. 109 These considerations may inform the observer when relevant, but when the 
considerations are at best prejudicial their inclusion is inappropriate. Without the consideration 
of those prejudicial facts in Green, the observer sees a display of the Ten Commandments and 
the Mayflower Compact, in a public space, approved by a Board of Commissioners and with 
little more information.110 The observer's endorsement determination then turns on the objective 
view of the display without prejudicial information and likely results in the display successfully 
surviving litigation. 
E. Reasonable Memory and Prospective Vision 
Memory of the past is relevant for courts evaluating a challenged display or practice. 111 
Judges often invoke the social history of the area in which a display occurs as being relevant just 
as they discuss the history of enacting laws and displays. 112 Unfortunately, some judges use the 
observer's memory not just for understanding the meaning of the current display or the context 
the display exists in, but to create an unreasonable observer. 113 The use of an unreasonable 
108 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 766 (1995) (Scalia, J., opining). 
109 Green, 568 F.3d at 800. 
IIo Id at 803. 
III McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005). 
uz See Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1121 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing the locality's history of anti-
Semitism); Doe v. Indian River School District; 653 F.3d 256,286-87 (3rd Cir. 2011) (noting the contentious history 
of prayer at public events locally is "illuminating"); Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1028-
34 (9th Cir. 2010) (addressing the social history under which "under God" was added to the Pledge of Allegiance). 
113 See, e.g., Borden v. Sch. Dist. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3D 153, 178-79 (3rd Cir. 2008) (utilizing an observer who 
was hyper-sensitive to past activities, and:who attributed too much tangential prejudiced history to the observer 
during the inquiry). 
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memory is a misapplication of Justice O'Connor's instruction and leads to precisely the kind of 
subjectivity that the reasonable observer inquiry must not tolerate.114 
Memory and prospective vision are also relevant in understanding the context of a 
display or practice.115 Some judges insinuate that the reasonable observer, upon viewing a 
display or practice in a public forum, understands simultaneously that past uses of the forum for 
secular displays and displays of other faiths change the display they encounter and accordingly 
treat time like a visible fourth dimension.116 In that light, the observer also looks forward with 
prospective vision to displays that will occur because such a consideration allows the observer to 
weigh displays in new forums in their proper context.117 
Failure to implement the prospective vision standard inhibits governments that have 
newly-created public forums from accommodating displays otherwise allowed in an established 
forum. Similarly, even in places where a well-established public forum exists, if the only display 
thus far is religious, that is not an indication, without some other proof, that the forum is hostile 
to secular displays or that only religious displays exist there permissibly. Prospective vision is a 
useful and powerful tool, which the observer should use to complement his reasonable memory 
114 If courts follow the instruction that the observer is akin to the reasonable man of tort law, then there is clearly no 
room for hostility in the observer's memory. See generally Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 
U.S. 753, 779-80 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) Qikening the reasonable man to the reasonable observer); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 283 cmt. c (1965) (noting that the reasonable man's "conduct is always up to 
standard."). 
115 See, e.g., Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga. v. Miller, 5 F.3d, 1383, 1392 (11th Cir. 1993); Ams. United for Separation of 
Church and State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 1549 (6th Cir. 1992) (en bane) ("The reasonable observer 
knows that other speakers have used the Plaza before, and will do so again."). 
116 Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga., 5 F.3d, at 1392; Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, 980 F.2d at 1549. 
117 For example, a town might declare a piece of property to be a new public park, and the first group to use the park 
for a function might be a religious organization, but that does not mean a secular group will not use the park in the 
future, nor does it mean that the church will ever use it again. This leaves a reasonable observer in no position to 
fmd an endorsement. Similarly, a single use denial would not be sufficient to fmd a disavowal without more 
evidence. 
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and understanding of the past. Such an observer protects from unreasonable tides of public 
perception and reduces both baseless hostility and undue deference toward religious displays. 
F A Reasonable Mind 
As important as the many other characteristics of the observer are, perhaps his most 
valuable, and unfortunately malleable, trait is his reasonability. Justice O'Connor surely did not 
choose the words "reasonable observer" on a whim, nor did she keep using them for two decades 
as a matter of convenience. The reasonable observer should be unassailable and incapable of 
unreasonable action, just like the reasonable person of tort law. 118 
The observer must not view a display looking for violations and conspiracies to violate 
the Establishment Clause; to do so would not be reasonable. 119 He carries no prejudices. The 
observer must not "look upon religion with a jaundiced eye, and religious speech need not yield 
to those who do."120 The Court rejected a nonadherent as the reasonable observer, 121 and 
analogously courts should freely dismiss zealots as the observer.122 A disinterested observer 
who understands that the United States is, by design, religiously accommodating and comprised 
of citizens of many faiths is the proper standard. 123 The status of the reasonable observer as a 
118Pinette, 515 U.S. at 779-780 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
119 See Briggs v. Mississippi, 331 F.3d 499 (5th Cir. 2003). Judge Kelly cogently analogized the situation when be 
opined ''[t]he fact that there were monuments for the Classes of 1954 and 1955 does not mean that the County 
preferred those classes over those graduating in 1957 or any other year." Green v. Haskell Cnty. Bd. ofComm'rs, 
574 F.3d 1235, 1243 (lOth Cir. 2009) (denial of rehearing en bane) (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
120 Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, 980 F.2d at 1553. The mere presence of religion, or religiously 
affiliated symbols and tests, is not an establishment clause violation. Van Orden v. Perry 545 U.S. 677, 691 (2005). 
121Pinette, 515 U.S. at 779 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
122 Id; Skoros v. City ofNew York, 437 F.3d 1, 30 (2nd Cir. 2006) (rejecting the thought of a violation resting in the 
eyes of a single individual); Gaylor v. United States., 74 F.3d 214 (lOth Cir. 1996) (rejecting the need for empirical 
data when considering a challenge to "In God We Trust'' being on currency). 
123 This conclusion would seem to,follow from Justice O'Connor's allusion to tort law's reasonable observer. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 283 cmt. e (1965) (stating that the reasonable observer is freed from the 
shackles of interest in the action, and therefore freed from the tendency "to prefer his own interests to those of 
others."). Furthennore Justice Thomas opined that the observer is of"indetenninate religious affiliation," and courts 
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fiction allows us to strip from him all inclinations that any real person, or group of people, has 
toward or against religion and grant him true objectivity as Justice O'Connor envisioned in 
Lynch. 
The observer's objectivity exists not only in the present but extends to past and future 
conduct as well. Furthermore, judges should direct the observer's reasonability towards both 
individuals and governments.124 Just because an endorsement or disavowal existed in the past 
should not bar an individual or government from similar conduct in the future. 125 For example, a 
newly erected display almost exactly the same as one that constituted a violation might exist in a 
public space but, due to some kind of disclaimer or facet that diminishes the perceived 
endorsement, the current display is constitutionally permissible.126 Governments that do little to 
change the reasonable perception of the observer, as in McCreary County v. A CL U of Kentucky, 
rightly find themselves limited by their past transgressions.127 The observer must remain 
objective when looking into the past or the future and he should not carry bias against current 
acts by virtue of a past Establishment Clause violator carrying them out or supporting them 
openly. 
With the imposition of a reasonable mind, having a reasonable memory and prospective 
vision, one understands the troubles of the decision reached by the Third Circuit in Borden v. 
could conclude that as such a hypothetical, the observer has no interest in any religious belief. Van Orden v. Perry, 
545 U.S. 677,696 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
124 See, e.g., Peck v. Upshur Cnty. Bd. ofEduc., 155 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 1998); Kreisner v. San Diego 1 F.3D 775, 
784 (9th Cir. 1993). 
125 Granzeier v. Middleton, 173 F.3d 568, 576 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that the acts of an errant individual posting 
overtly religious closing signs, though a state employee, do not taint the practices of the entire government to 
closure on that day). But see, Borden v. Sch. Dist. of E. Brunswick. 523 F.3D 153, 187-88 (3rd Cir. 2008) 
(illustrating the difficult position a public school football coach who had past endorsement violations would be in 
should another individual choose to pray at a football game). 
126 ACLU of N.J. v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92, 107 (3rd Cir. 1999); Ams. United for Separation of Church and State v. 
City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 1549 (6th Cir. 1992) (en bane) (holding a truly private display of religious 
symbols in a public forum is not an endorsement). 
127 McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 850-51 (2005). 
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School District of East Brunswick.128 In Borden, the Third Circuit determined that a high school 
football coach who led prayers for his football team for twenty-three years could not participate 
in or respectfully observe future prayers the team might choose to initiate of its own accord.129 
The court justified this decision as complying with the Supreme Court's rationale in Santa Fe 
Independent School District v. Doe, but the cases are clearly distinguishable.130 
In Borden, nothing stopped the team's continued prayer before games; the only person 
prohibited from participating or being respectful and silent during the prayer was their head 
coach, Mr. Borden.131 In Santa Fe, the question was whether it was permissible for a speaker to 
deliver invocations addressed to the crowds at school-sponsored events. 132 A direct analogy 
between the two cases would be a player or coach on the team delivering an invocation to the 
crowd and the team on the field or the public address announcer asking the crowd to be silent 
while the team prayed, but neither of those situations was present in Borden. 
By prohibiting Mr. Borden from kneeling during his team's prayer, or even watching in 
silent support, the Third Circuit puts Mr. Borden in an impossible position; he must involuntarily 
violate the Constitution because his position is marked with the imprimatur of government 
authority. 133 In the future, Mr. Borden must either turn away so the reasonable observer 
perceives that the government is turning its back on religious prayer, thus disavowing it, or he 
must be respectfully silent or reverent, which leads to the conclusion that government endorses 
religion. He cannot permissibly tell the team its members may not pray, because doing so would 
128Borden, 523 F.3d at 158-59. 
129 Jd at 179. 
130 Jd. at 176-77. 
131 !d. at 178. 
132 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 297-98 (2000). 
133 Borden, 523 F.3d at 177 n. 20. 
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violate their religious freedom. For Mr. Borden to continue his employment as a football coach 
in East Brunswick he must violate the Constitution. Such a result is not reasonable. 
Mr. Borden's past prayers were a violation; of this there is no doubt in light of Santa 
Fe. 134 He organized and sometimes led public prayers at football games with the imprimatur of 
government authority by virtue ofbis position.135 However, in a proper analysis of the current 
conduct, the reasonable observer undoubtedly notes that Mr. Borden stopped leading the prayers 
and is simply accommodating his team's religious expression.136 The observer would not ignore 
the past conduct. He surely should look at the past and understand the conduct that occurred 
before the school asked Mr. Borden to stop leading prayers, and similarly understand that future 
football teams under Mr. Borden's leadership could decide they wi11 not have a team prayer 
independent of Mr. Borden's influence. Weighing these past, present and future acts, a 
reasonable minded observer, having a reasonable memory and prospective vision, should see Mr. 
Borden's current actions as an accommodation of religion, which is squarely within 
constitutional bounds. 
G. The "Would" Requirement 
Too often, courts applying the endorsement test's reasonable observer inquiry do not 
comply with the language used by Justice O'Connor.137 The inquiry, by design, disallows 
134 ld. at 176. 
135 ld 
136 ld at 161-62. 
137 See, e.g., Am. Atheists v. Duncan, 637 F.3d 1095, 1121 (lOth Cir. 2010) (discussing what a reasonable observer 
"may" believe), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011); Young v. Beard, 284 F. App'x 958, 964 (3rd Cir. 2008) (using a 
"could" standard in determining a prison terminating a music program did not violate the First Amendment); 
Bannon v. Sch. Dist., 387 F.3d 1208, 1220 (lith Cir. 2004) (also using a "could" standard); Knights of Columbus v. 
Town of Lexington, 272 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir. 2001) (using a ''might'' standard in evaluating a statute that prohibited, 
among other unattended displays, the local holiday display); Smith v. Cnty. of Albemarle, 895 F.2d 953, 962 (4th 
Cir. 1990) (Blatt, J., dissenting) (using a ''could" standard to evaluate whether a town allowing a private group to 
erect a creche on public land was permissible). The lower bar of a "could" standard, advocated by Justice Stevens, 
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alternatives and possibilities that are not certain. 138 The use of ''could," ''might," or ''may" in the 
standard opens up a door for a heckler's veto because it promotes the search for the smallest or 
most sensitive viewpoint and lowers the bar dramatically for the display, law or practice to 
violate the Establishment Clause.139 Just as there is no room for judges to attempt to attribute 
potential alternative observers with regard to age or number, there is no room for judges to 
attempt to analyze what a potential observer "might" see. 140 The appropriate standard is 
"would."141 The observer is an ideal hypothetical standard, if his perception of what he observes 
does not lead him to conclude that there is an impermissible endorsement then the challenged 
display or practice passes constitutional muster under the observer inquiry of the endorsement 
test. 142 
H Rejecting the "Community !dear~ 
Justice O'Connor opined that the reasonable observer's identity is a determination that 
judges should ground in the "community ideal of social judgment, as well as rational 
ultimately creates a hecklers veto and would not adequately protect the First Amendment. Capitol Square Review & 
Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 799-800 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
138 See, e.g., Freedom From Religion Foundation v. Hanover Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2010) C'[T]he 
constitutionality of a state statute does not turn on the subjective feelings of plaintiffs as to whether a religious 
endorsement has occurred."); Baucbman v. W. High School, 132 F.3d 542, 556 (lOth Cir. 1997) (determining that 
while some observers might be more sensitive, and therefore find endorsement in the song selection for the holiday 
concert, that is not the standard for the reasonable observer); Ams. United for Separation of Church and State v. City 
of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 1550 (6th Cir. 1992) (opining that the reasonable observer standard is not what ''an 
unreasonable person could think of the display" but rather" what a reasonable person would think."). 
139 If the use of a young observer creates a heckler's veto by lowering the bar, then surely a standard that accepts 
alternative views would do the same. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119 (2001). 
140 ACLU of Ohio Foundation, Inc. v. Ashbrook, 375 F.3d 484, 503 (6th Cir. 2004) (Batchelder, J., dissenting); 
Briggs v. Mississippi, 331 F.3d 499,507 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that a reasonable observer would not see 
endorsement in Mississippi's state flag by virtue of a "St. Andrew's Cross" being displayed, even though the 
litigants and others might see a religious symbol); Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 245 F.3d 49, 78-79 (2nd Cir. 
2001). 
141 See, e.g., Books v. Elkhart Cnty., 401 F.3d 857, 867 (7th Cir. 2005) ("This does not mean, however, that to 
constitutionally display a religious item on public property the government must ensure that it offends no one. That 
would be asking the impossible."); ACLU of Ohio Foundation, Inc., 375 F.3d at 505-06 (Batchelder, J., dissenting). 
142 See Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, 980 F.2d at 1550 (determining that the standard is not '~hat 
an unreasonable person could think of the display" but instead '~hat a reasonable person would think."). 
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judgment."143 However, after nearly three decades of applying the endorsement test, it is clear 
that courts must eliminate the community ideal from the inquiry because it is unworkable.144 
Judges use this "community ideal" instruction to permit a community's values to bear on the 
reasonable observer, which yields a blatantly impermissible result by creating an observer who 
harbors the bias or deference ofthe community. 145 Allowing a community's subjective values to 
infiltrate the metric against which we measure endorsement destroys any hope of uniformity in 
the courts and opens up room for a heckler's veto.146 The application ofthe "community ideal" 
is far too ambiguous, and any potential definition of that term creates either constitutional or 
practical issues. 
If judges defme "community" as a small political area, say a town or county, religious 
and atheistic enclaves might spring up and the unanimity of opinion in their communities would 
result in the abolition or acceptance of all religious displays. Judges would promote, under the 
guise of conforming to Justice 0' Connor's endorsement test, enclave formation by informing 
adherents that where enough of them gather they may use government to endorse religion. 1bis 
yields an illogical conclusion as it forces the observer into the prohibited situation of becoming 
an adherent to a particular majority faith. 147 Furthermore, such a holding erodes the 
143 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 35 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
144 The community ideal's advantage in tort law is that it looks away from an individual's standard for negligence. 
RESTATENIENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 283 cmt. c (1965). However, the advantage of the reasonable man is the 
downfall of the reasonable observer if courts let an individual community create its own standard for First 
Amendment violations. The concept of a 4'community ideal" in tort law is not intended to calculate any actual course 
of behavior conducted by actual people. ld Rather the "ideal" is neither found in individuals alone, or in a 
collective, making any head count determining the 4'community ideal" an incorrect interpretation. Id 
145 Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1110 (9th C:ir. 2011); Skoros v City ofN.Y., 437 F.3d 1, 47 (2nd C:ir. 
2006) (Straub, J., dissenting); Bauchman v. W. High School, 132 F.3d 542,556 (lOth Cir. 1997). 
146 Newdow, 542 U.S. at 34--35 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
147 See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
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constitutional standard and ultimately fails to protect anyone from government endorsement of 
religion. 148 
If a small community is unworkable, then it would be logical to seek a broader standard 
that, potentially, provides a useful metric but this analysis also proves unworkable. Courts 
should not saddle the observer with the unenviable task of identifying the current standard of a 
state or nation because the fluctuating metric provides little guidance, and identification of the 
current standard would prove impractical, if not impossible.149 This broader approach would 
reduce constitutional protections to a judge's best guesses or considerations of polling data. The 
task would be burdensome, lack uniformity and ultimately be dangerous to the preservation of 
First Amendment rights. 
Justice O'Connor instructed that courts should not engage in a head count before 
protecting constitutional rights, which indicates that the test should not accept subjective input on 
the "average" or "community" ideal.150 Just as the reasonable person in tort law is beyond 
ordinary standards, and not swayed by what a juror or several jurors would do, the reasonable 
observer does not change based on the surrounding community or its conduct.151 Judges should 
not allow an increasingly secular or sectarian community to influence their decisions; such a 
consideration only serves to create an unnecessary variable for courts to attempt to apply, 
decreasing uniformity and going against the instruction of Justice O'Connor and the 
148 The endorsement test provides protection only so long as the objectivity remains in the observer. A subjective 
view is too polarizing to fall within the Constitutional standard that requires accommodation but non-endorsement. 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,673 (1984) (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,314-315 (1952)). 
149 Justice O'Connor called the religious heterogeneity of America ~~dizzying" and admitted its incorporation into the 
test would render the endorsement analysis an "absurdity." Newdow, 542 U.S. 34-35 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
150 McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 884 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
151 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 283 cmt. c (1965). 
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Constitution.152 For clarity, the test should not incorporate the words "community ideal." If 
judges accept the true identity of the reasonable observer as completely hypothetical and 
objective, there is no need for a ''community ideal" inquiry. 
1 Affecting Standing in the Political Community 
Justice O'Connor opined that the crux of the observer inquiry in the endorsement analysis 
is an attempt to discover whether the reasonable observer perceives the ideals expressed through 
the display, law or practice affects standing in the political community.153 However, many courts 
do not even cite this goal when applying the endorsement test, and instead end their analysis by 
determining whether an endorsement or disavowal of religion exists.154 This is an incomplete 
application of the endorsement test as Justice O'Connor envisioned it. 
The observer is only a vehicle through which courts determine if there is an effect to 
political standing. Finding religious meaning in a display, practice or disavowal may be a 
prerequisite for the endorsement test, but this is not the test's ultimate inquiry. 155 In Justice 
O'Connor's analysis, the endorsement or disavowal of religion must further affect, or have the 
impermissible perception of an effect on, standing in the political community in order to violate 
the First Amendment.156 In order for there to be an effect on political standing, the test requires 
something more than a nonadherent experiencing discomfort.157 Without this greater 
impermissible result an endorsement of religion is only the shadow of a threat. 158 
152 McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 884 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
153 Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
154E.g., Knights of Columbus v. Town of Lexington, 272 F.3d25 (1st Cir. 2001). 
155 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,780 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
156 !d. 
157 Id 
158 Sch: Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 308 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
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Justice 0' Connor accepted the proposition that there is an endorsement when "pressure 
upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain."159 
Some take this to mean Justice O'Connor's observer should concern himself with the ability to 
"help shape political decisions."160 Some judges take a similar view but also erroneously use a 
subjective approach to determine whether the challenged display or practice has relevance to 
standing in the political community.161 However, just as there is no reason to expose the 
endorsement test to a heckler's veto at any earlier point in the analysis, it is illogical to invite 
judges to do so at the last step of their inquiry. 
This step is where courts must '''distinguish between real threat and mere shadow."'162 
Real threat, a violation of the Establishment Clause, only exists where government's 
endorsement of religion has, at a minimum, the perception to the reasonable observer that 
religion is relevant to standing in the political community. 163 Because discussion regarding the 
meaning of "standing in the political community" is not plentiful, there is little more than Justice 
O'Connor's original instruction regarding an individual's feeling that religion is relevant to their 
"status in the political community."164 
159 Wallace v. Jaffree 472, U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concuning) (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 
431(1962)) (internal quotes omitted). 
160 Neil R. Feigenson, Political Standing and Government Endorsement of Religion: An Alternathle to Current 
Establishment Clause Doctrine, 40 DePaul L. Rev. 53, 67 (1991). 
161 Borden v. Sch. Dist. ofE. Brunswick, 523 F.3D 153, 185 (3rd Cir. 2008) (Barry, J., concurring). 
162 Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. at 308 (Goldberg, J., 
concurring)) (holding the presence of the cross on government insignia was not an endorsement). 
163 At this point courts must diverge from the perception of the reasonable observer with regard to who is affected by 
the political standing becoming relevant. As the observer is assumed to be of indetenninate religious belief, then his 
political standing could clearly never be affected by one religion being endorsed. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 
696 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
164 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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The majority opinion in Lynch, citing Justice Story, provides a standard that might prove 
to make the test workable: the idea of a political hierarchy based on religious belief.165 This 
standard allows the observer to remain objective and determine whether political standing is 
relevant without entering the biased fray himself. Furthermore the observer can protect the 
rights of all members of the political community with this standard. Where he fmds a political 
hierarchy created due to religious differences, in which he cannot hold either an elevated or 
disadvantaged position because he lacks determinate religious affiliation, then there is a 
proscribed government endorsement. This is also an adequate way to eradicate from the analysis 
distinctions drawn in the community that are not relevant to standing in the political community, 
but rather only the social community, or distinctions drawn on grounds other than religion. 166 
Simply put, the observer need only determine if an objective perception of the display, law or 
practice would recognize the existence of multiple classes of citizens, holding different amounts 
of political power, due to their religious beliefs. 
This element of the test helps to maintain an accommodating, and therefore appropriate, 
standard. Arguments from critics advance the idea that courts should not provide an 
accommodating standard for religion because doing so for one group might be at the expense of 
another. 167 Accom...modating the religious beliefs of the nation's populace, however, is 
definitively within the intention of the Constitution and a standard that appreciates that fact is 
165 Jd at 678 (majority opinion) (quoting 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 728 
(1833)); Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90 CALIF. L. 
REv. 673, 709 (2002). See also, Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,319 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting). 
166 McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 883 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (recognizing there is a "natural 
interplay" between competing beliefs but maintaining that government "distortion" of that interplay is 
impermissible). 
167 See, e.g., ACLU ofN.J. v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. ofEduc., 84 F.3d 1471, 1488 (3rd Cir. 1996) (en bane); 
Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 170 (5th Cir. 1991) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) ("A little accommodation is a 
dangerous thing-the floodwaters may not be far behind."). 
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appropriate.168 Justice O'Connor herself opined that the First Amendment's religion clauses, as 
envisioned by the Framers of the Constitution, have a fundamental goal of "preserving religious 
liberty to the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic society," and that "[b ]y enforcing the Clauses, 
we have kept religion a matter for the individual conscience, not for the prosecutor or 
bureaucrat."169 In light of these instructions, accommodation is the only acceptable standard. 
Neither hostility nor deference towards religion coming from the judiciary is acceptable where it 
simply substitutes for that which may not originate in the elected branches of government. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The endorsement test's reasonable observer inquiry presents a workable standard, given 
the proper refinements and a return to guiding principles. In the refmed analysis, the test departs 
from its broad "reasonable observer" language and narrows with a better understanding of its oft 
misapplied constituent parts. The test becomes: A single, mature observer, with reasonable 
knowledge and a reasonable perception of acts in all times, who observed the entirety of the 
challenged display or practice, and would reasonably find that the government endorsed or 
disavowed a religion such that he reasonably perceives that a political hierarchy, based on 
religion, exists. 
Of course, this test still has the shortcoming of a judge sometimes defming the line 
between reasonable and unreasonable knowledge or assumption and truly relevant history or 
superfluous information, but that variation is within an accepted range of discretion given to 
judges. The refined approach results in less uncertainty for both jurists and government officials 
malting discretionary decisions. It further ensures both the constitutionally mandated religious 
168 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673; Ind. Civil Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 779 (7th Cir. 2001) (Coffey, J., 
dissenting); Elewski v. City of Syracuse, 123 F.3d 51,54-55 (2nd Cir. 1997). 
169 McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 882 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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accommodation and separation continue to exist. The flexibility that remains in this refined 
reasonable observer analysis is the kind of flexibility Justice O'Connor perceived as a virtue. 
As the reasonable observer inquiry of the endorsement test exists today, judges 
inappropriately make subjective decisions, and they do so with widely varied results. Under the 
current standard, judges can create ''absurd" observers who are "replete with foibles." If we 
remove the easily misapplied variables from the hands of judges it will reduce error, provide less 
room for excessive judicial deference or hostility towards religion and facilitate a more uniform 
application of constitutional principles. Judges no longer need to engage in a Sisyphean task to 
protect religious freedom. By adopting this standard judges gain a useful tool, easily reproduced 
and applied to the full gamut of cases, which will create a clearer and more consistent metric for 
evaluating potential Establishment Clause violations and protecting First Amendment rights. 
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